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Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A Survey 
of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure 
SUSAN STUART* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When writing a survey article, there is a tendency for the author 
. . 
to search for some defect in the law of the surveyed cases, in order to 
demonstrate the author's acumen in theoretical reasoning, as opposed 
to that of the courts'. However, this survey topic the admissibility of 
evidence of other bad acts and crimes in a criminal trial does not lend 
itself to such a self -serving exercise. The law in Indiana with respect to 
this relatively narrow subject area is instead well-established and genera;lly 
well-reasoned. This survey period did include., however, several cases in 
which the practical application of the extant law rested upon a ques-
tionable foundation or was altogether improper. In most instances, the 
error was harmless, but the precedential use of such improper reasoning 
could well prove damaging in later cases. The purpose of this Article, 
therefore, is not to remedy any flaw in the law but to suggest a more 
temperate and circumspect approach to its practical application. Because 
of the frequency with which one specific context occurred during the 
survey period, the Article will particularly emphasize the principles gov-
erning the admissibility of unrelated crimes. and other bad acts as they 
are relevant to the charges at trial. 
II. TRIAL ADMISSION OF OTHER CRIMES AND MISCONDUCT GENERALLY 
The general rule in Indiana is that evidence of crimes and misconduct 
of a criminal defendant, other than of the charged offenses, is not 
admissible at trial.1 However, there are various exceptions to this rule 
of exclusion. Their application arises either when the defendant's char-
acter is at issue or when the proffered evidence is relevant to an element 
of the charged offense. The four exceptions most widely recognized in 
Indiana relate to (1) the defendant's bad character, (2) proof of the 
*Formerly associated with Buschmann, Carr & Meyer, Indianapolis; Fonner Law Clerk 
to the Honorable Stanley B. Miller, Indiana C.ourt of Appeals. B.A., DePauw University, 
1973; M.Ed., Valparaiso University. 1976; J.D .• Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis, 1982. The author expresses appreciation to Don Anderson for his patience 
and his editing skills. 
•E.g., Lee v. State, 271 Ind. 307, 3l2, 392 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1979); Bruce v. State, 
268 Ind. 180, 245, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1077, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 988 (1978); Paulson 
v. State, 181 Ind. App .. 559, 560, 393 N .E.2d 211, 212 (1979). 
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crime on trial, (3) the res gestae of the charged offense, and (4) cumulative 
and/or explanatory evidence after the defendant himself has broached 
the subject. 
A. Admissibility to Prove Defendant's Character 
.· 
There are two reasons why a court may admit evidence of other 
crimes to show a defendant'S unsavory character. The foremost . reason 
is to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness.2 This particular 
''bad character'' exception has statutory underpinnings, 3 but its eviden-
tiary use is limited to a defendant's "prior convictions for crimes which 
would have rendered a witness incompetent. These crimes are: treason, 
murder, rape, arson, burglary, robbery[,] kidnapping, forgery and wilful 
and corrupt perjury. , 4 The rationale for allowing such use is that the 
nature of the convictions reflects upon a witness's propensity for truth 
and veracity while testifying at trial. 5 
The second use of ''bad character" evidence, on the other hand, 
permits introduction of a wider array of bad conduct but can only be 
applied on a more limited scope. This use occurs when a criminal 
defendant places his character directly into evidence as part of his defense 
strategy. Once a defendant's reputation for good character is at issue, 
the state may then offer specific acts of prior misconduct into evidence 
as contradictory proof of bad character. 6 However, use of bad character 
evidence for this purpose is limited by rules of relevance and therefore 
must go directly to contradict the defense's evidence.7 Such a limitation 
is to assure, to the extent possible, that the bad character evidence is 
circumscribed for use only as rebuttal evidence rather than as substantive 
proof of the defendant's guilt of the charged offense. 8 Therefore, in 
2See Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles and Modern 
Trends, 34 IND. L.J. l. 23 (1958). 
3IND. CoDE § 34-1-14-14 (1982) states, "Any fact which might heretofore be shown 
to render a witness incompetent, may be hereafter shown to affect his credibil'ity." 
4Ashton v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51. 63, 279 N.E.2d 210, 217 (1972); see also Daniels 
v. State, 274 Ind. 29, 32, 408 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (1980). 
5Ashton. 258 Ind. at 62, 279 N.E.2d at 217 ("only those convictions for crimes 
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be admissible"). The Indiana Supreme Court 
has further declared that a witness' credibility may be impeached only by convictions, 
not generic bad acts. Hensley v. State. 256 Ind. 258, 262, 268 N.E.2d 90, 92 (1971). 
6E.g., Hauger v. State, 273 Ind. 481, 483, 405 N.E~2d 526, 527 (1980); Robertson 
v. State, 262 Ind. 562, 565, 319 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1974). 
7See Bond v. State, 273 Ind. 233, 240-41, 403 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1980); Robertson, 
262 Ind. at 566, 319 N .E.2d at 836. 
8See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404, which states; ''Evidence of a person's character or 
a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion ... /'; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAMt JR.; 
fEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5236, at 397 (1978) (hereinafter FEDERAL P:aACTICE 
& PROCEDURE]. 
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either of these two situations, a prosecutor may not generally impute 
bad character through evidence of other crimes unless the defendant 
first places his character at issue, either directly or by merely taking the 
witness stand. However, there are other situations in which a prosecutor 
may offer such evidence for the purpose of substantively proving guilt, 
aside from bad character generally. 
B. Admissibility to Prove Charged Offense 
A second method of circumventing the general prohibition against 
use of other crime evidence is to proffer other unrelated crimes and 
bad acts as relevant proof that the defendant committed the offense 
with which he is charged. 9 The Indiana Supreme Court adopted this 
exclusion long ago when it stated: 
"It is only on rare occasions that proof of the commission of 
another crim,e by a defendant is either necessary or helpful 
towards establishing the crime with which he is charged. Hence 
the evidence is ordinarily irrelevant, while at the same time its 
admission would necessarily operate to so prejudice a jury against 
a defendant as that in a doubtful case it might control the 
verdict. * * * But it has never been held by any court of 
responsible authority that the people cannot prove the facts 
constituting another crime, when those facts also tend to establish 
that the defendant committed the crime for which he is on trial. 
Such a holding would accomplish the absurd result of permitting 
a rule intended to prevent a defendant from being prejudiced 
in the eyes of the jury because of his life of crime to so operate 
in certain cases as to prevent the people from proving the facts 
necessary to convict him of the crime charged. " 10 
Further refinement of this principle has especially focused on the relevancy 
of the other crime evidence to specific facts in dispute. 
Indiana appellate courts look chiefly at whether the evidence of 
unrelated crimes proves or tends to prove a fact in issue at trial. 11 This 
connection has been variously characterized as ''a fact in issue,''l2 "any 
9See, e.g., Hergenrother v. State, 215 Ind. 89, 18 N.E.2d 784 (1939). 
'
0/d. at 94-95, 18 N .E.2d at 787 (quoting People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 340, 
61 N.E. 286, 312 (1901)). 
11See, e.g., Tippett v. State, 272 Ind. 624, 627, 400 N.E.2d 1115, 1117-18 (1980); 
Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 245, 375 N .E.2d 1042, 1077, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 
(1978); Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 495, 355 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1976); Kallas v. 
State, 227 Ind. 103, 114, 83 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1949)~ 
12Tippett, 272 Ind. at 627, 400 N.E.2d at 1118; Maldonado, 265 Ind. at 495, 355 
N.E.2d at 846; Gaston v. State, 451 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
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material fact," 13 "any essential element of the crime charged," 14 and 
"an issue in serious dispute at the trial." ts As succinctly stated by the 
Indiana Supreme Court: ''[T]he law will not permit the State to depart 
from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or 
misconduct that have no natural connection with the pending 
charge .... '' 16 This restriction obviously prevents the introduction of 
other crime evidence merely to present the defendant to the jury as a 
person with a "criminal bent." 17 The state therefore is constrained to 
present other crime evidence only in the context and within the confines 
of the charged offense. This principle is the rule of logical relevance. 18 
Typically, other crime evidence can be fitted into specific categ&ies 
of logical relevance. The list of categories intent, motive, purpose, 
identity, common scheme or plan, and guilty knowledge has been recited 
so frequently as to approach the form of a litany .19 And the admission 
of evidence within these categories may be appropriate not only for 
proving the commission of the charged offense but also for disproving 
a defense. 20 There exists a further well-recognized category in Indiana 
law in which evidence of a more general pattern (rather than of discrete 
offenses) is admissible. This pattern is admitted for its tendency to prove 
a defendant's guilt at a sex offense trial under th.e "depraved sexual 
instinct" exception. 21 Under the current state of the law then, Indiana 
courts have established fairly well-defined guidelines for admitting evi-
dence of other crimes under the relevancy exception. 
There is, however, a further limit on this exception, regardless of 
the evidence.' s logical relevance to the trial. Even if the logical relevance 
of other crime evidence is established within the categories listed above, 
uKallas, 227 Ind. at 114, 83 N.E.2d at 773. 
'"Hergenrother, 215 Ind. at 96, 18 N.E.2d at 787. 
'
5Thornton v. State, 268 Ind. 456, 458, 376 N .E.2d 492, 493 0.978). 
'
60unn v. State, 162 Ind. 174, 182, 70 N .E. 521, 523 ( 1904). 
•'Bruce, 268 Ind. at 245, 375 N.E.2d at 1077; see also Lee v. State, 271 Ind. 307, 
312, 392 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1979). 
HI See, e.g., FED. R. Ev1n. 401, which defines relevant evidence as "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'' 
'
9See Haynes v. State, 411 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); see also Cobbs 
v. State, 264 Ind. 60, 62, 338 N.E.2d 632, 633 (1975); Paulson v. State, 181 Ind. App. 
559, 560, 393 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1979). 
20E.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ind. 62, 66, 366 N .E.2d 1186, 1189 (1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 975 (1978); Henderson v. State, 259 Ind. 248, 251, 286 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1972); 
Kallas, 227 Ind. at 122, 83 N .E.2d at 777. 
21E.g., Bowen v. State, 263 Ind. 558, 563, 334 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1975); Miller v. 
State. 256 Ind. 296, 299, 268 N.E.2d 299, 301 (1971); Lamar v. State, 245 Ind. 104, 109, 
195 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1964). The "depraved sexual instinct" exception is utilized only where 
the offenses exhibit an ''unnatural" sexual proclivity, such as for sodomy or for incest. 
Cobbs, 264 Ind. at 62-63, 338 N.E.2d at 633-34. 
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a court may still exclude it if such evidence lacks legal relevance. 22 
Evidence is legally irrelevant if it will mislead the jury or if it is too 
remote from the charged offense. 23 Evidence of other crimes is inherently 
prejudicial to some extent. For such other crime evidence to be admissible, 
therefore, its probative value must substantially outweigh its prejudicial 
• 
effect on the jury. 24 Otherwise, it may seriously affect the defendant's 
right to a fair trial, 25 and trial courts, in their discretion, may exclude 
it.26 
In sum, the chief concern with respect to legal relevance is whether 
the jury is likely to find a defendant guilty due to his mere participation 
in other crimes rather than upon proof of the elements of the charged 
offense. The relevancy exception for the introduction of other crime 
evidence is therefore in counterpoise to the bad character exception 
because the trial court's primary purpose is to exclude evidence that is 
relevant only to showing a defendant's bad character. In contrast, the 
res gestae and cumulative evidence exceptions evince very little concern 
regarding the substantive effect of evidence of bad character. 
C. Admissibility Under Miscellaneous Exceptions 
There are two other instances in Indiana where the general rule of 
exclusion can be overridden by the circumstances of the individual case. 
The first, the res gestae exception, permits the admission of evidence 
of other crimes where they are part of the same transaction. Such 
evidence includes "ac:ts, statements, occurrences and circumstances sub-
stantially contemporaneous with the crime charged. " 27 This exception, 
too, is not without bounds and is committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. 28 
The final exception is more an estoppel of the defendant's right to 
object to the admission of other crime evidence than a true exception. 
This estoppel occurs when the defense ''opens the door'' by eliciting 
22See, e.g., FED. R. Ev1o. 403, stating that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
23Hergenrother, 215 Ind. at 94, 18 N .E.2d at 786. 
24See supra note 22; see also Paulson, 181 Ind. App. at 561, 393 N.E.2d at 212. 
2~Thornton, 268 Ind. at 458, 376 N.E.2d at 493. 
26Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982); Wilson v. State, 432 N.E.2d 30 
(Ind. 1982); Tippett, 272 Ind. at 627, 400 N.E.2d at 1117-18; Thornton, 268 Ind. at 458, 
376 N.E.2d at 493; Manuel v. State, 267 Ind. 436, 438, 370 N.E.2d 904, 905·06 (1977). 
27Lee v. State, 267 Ind. 315, 320, 270 N .E.2d 327, 329 (1977) (citation omitted); 
Gross v. State, 267 Ind. 405, 407, 370 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1977) (quoting Kiefer v. State, 
241 Ind. 176, 178, 169 N.E.2d 723, 724 (1960)). 
28Blankenship v. Statte, 462 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. 1984). 
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testimony of other crimes directly29 or by introducing testimony of only 
. . 
part of a story, the completion of which includes evidence of other 
crimes. 3° Clearly, a defendant has no right to complain of the state's 
use of such evidence when he was the party who broached the subject 
in the first instance. Beyond these two miscellaneous exceptions, the 
main inquiry into the admissibility of other crimes evidence is still whether 
the defendant has placed his reputation in issue or whether the state 
can convince the court that the evidence is both logically and legally 
relevant to a material fact at issue. 
Ill. RECENT CASES 
Most of the notable recent cases concerned the relevancy exception, 
although a few cases pertained to the other three exceptions. The surveyed 
cases range from the well-reasoned Burch v. State,31 where the Indiana 
Court of Appeals was faced with an alibi defense and the dilemma of 
proving identity with evidence of another crime, to the scantily reasoned 
Stout v. State,32 which upheld the admissibility of an accomplice's tes-
timony to a defendant's participation in prior crimes by relying on but 
a single precedent which had no rationale. Between these two extremes 
were cases addressing the use of an evidentiary "harpoon" and proper 
and improper admissions of police investigations, as well as an assortment 
of cases where the court reached the right result despite the reasons 
• gtven. 
Critiquing these cases is difficult because any analysis of relevancy 
is necessarily subjective. No bright-line objective template can be applied 
by appellate courts to such cases because the standard of review is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion.33 It is clear in some cases, 
however, that the evidence had little, if any, relevance to the case and 
its admission would have been prejudicial error but for the harmless 
error doctrine. 34 This Article attempts to demonstrate flaws in the ap-
plications of the law and to suggest how these problems may be resolved. 
29See, e.g., Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 76"77, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978). 
30See, e.g., Davis v. State, 481 N .E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ind. 1985). 
•
11487 N .E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
32479 N .E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985). 
33E.g., Wagner v. State, 474 N .E.2d 476, 493 (Ind. 1985); Fisher v. State, 468 N .E.2d 
1365, 1368 (Ind. 1984); Mayes v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Ind. 1984) ("Trial 
courts have wide discretion in determining whether proffered evidence is relevant. We will 
not disturb the courCs ruling upon such a matter, absent a clear abuse of that discretion."). 
14See FED. R. C1v. P. 61; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), which states that "[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shaH be 
disregarded.'' 
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A. Right Result, Right Reason 
One of the best reasoned cases of the survey period also included 
one of the closest judgment calls. In Burch v. State, 35 a jury found the 
defendant guilty of attempted robbery and battery, both while the defend-
ant was armed with a deadly weapon.16 The state's case relied upon the 
following salient facts: On Thursday, November 3, 1983, at 7:45 p.m., 
the defendant accosted a Ball State University co-ed on the second level 
of a parking garage on the university campus. The defendant ''goosed" 
the victim and then followed her to her car, questioning her about her 
plans for the evening~ When they reached the victim's car, the defendant 
drew a knife and ordered her into her car. After she refused, the 
defendant pressed the knife to her chest and demanded her backpack 
from the car. A struggle ensued, and the defendant fled. The victim 
identified Burch as her assailant. Burch interposed an alibi defense. 37 
To impeach the alibi, the state presented evidence of a similar uncharged 
attack. 
Another Ball State co-ed testified to an incident that occurred the 
following Thursday evening, in the same location of the same parking 
garage and with similar sexual overtones. The victim of this second 
incident, however, recognized her attacker and was able to locate his-. 
the defendant's photograph in her high school yearbook. The state 
argued this other crime testimony was essential to surmount the defend-
ant's alibi.38 The court of ap·peals agreed.39 
After a thorough analysis of the factual similarities and the differ-
ences in the two incidents, the court determined that the key similarities 
in the two occurrences time, location, and sexual characteristics pre-
sented a similar and distinctive "modus operandi,'' relevant to the 
question of the assailant's identity raised by the defendant's alibi de-
fense. 40 The court admitted that the facts presented ''a very close question," 
but because "identity was the primary issue," the other crime evidence 
was crucial to the state's case and therefore was admissible.41 However 
close the question, under the abuse of discretion standard, the court 
reached the correct conclusion. 
The ''modus operandi'' exception to the general rule is a w~ll­
recognized method of proving identity.42 To fit within this category, 
35487 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
36/d. at 177. 
37/d. at 179. 
38/d. 
l9Jd. 
~OJ d. 
41/d. (footnote omitted). 
42See FEDERAL PRACTICE &. PROCEDURE, s~pra note 8, § 5246, at 512. 
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. 
"[t]he acts or methods employed must be so similar, unusual, and 
distinctive as to earmark them as the acts of the accused. ''43 The difficulty 
with the facts in Burch is that sexual attacks upon women in parking 
garages are not uncommon. However, repeated attacks at the same time 
on the same day of the week at the same location do create a distinctive 
pattern. The fact that both victims positively identified the defendant 
as their assailant greatly lessened the opportunity for error and added 
yet another distinguishing feature to the ''modus operandi" of the attacks. 
The nature of the other crime evidence was also not so inflammatory 
as to make it legally irrelevant. Therefore, this evidence was properly 
admitted because the exception's requirements were scrupulously applied~ 
The ''modus operandi" exception was also the compelling reason 
for admitting evidence of other bad acts in Ea-kins v. State.44 In Eakins, 
a high school music teacher was charged with battery and telephone 
harassment arising out of an incident with one of his female students.45 
During her freshman year, the young girl had complained to school 
authorities about the defendant's amorous attentions to his female stu ... 
dents as well as his physical contacts with them. During the following 
school year, the defendant hugged and kissed the complainant. Not long 
afterward, the girl's family began to receive harassing and obscene 
telephone calls that were later traced to the defendant's home. The girl 
identified the defendant as the caller. However, the defendant evidently 
denied the allegation because the identity of the caller became the focal 
issue at trial. 46 In response to the defendant's apparent denial, the state 
introduced testimony of a former student who described her sexual 
relationship with the defendant.47 This former student testified that when 
she terminated her involvement with the defendant, she received an 
abusive telephone call from him as well as repeated hang-ups. Although 
the similarity of events is perhaps not as distinctive as in Burch, the 
two incidents here were significantly unique because both girls were 
familiar with the defendant and the sound of this voice. Because telephone 
offenses are so intrinsically difficult to prove inasmuch as the victim 
does not see the perpetrator, the other crime evidence in this case was 
extremely logically relevant to the issue of the caller's identity .. 48 Thus, 
4
·lWillis v. State, 268 Ind. 269, 272, 374 N .E.2d 520, 522 (1978) (citation omitted). 
44484 N .E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), 
45/d. at 608. 
46/d. The facts are not clear with respect to the defendant's case. The. only other 
issue addressed on appeal concerned '"newly discovered" evidence that the defendant's 
son had made similar telephone calls. /d. at 609. One can therefore assume that the 
defendant denied any part in the offense; otherwise, this newly discovered evidence would 
not have been necessary. 
4
'/d. at 608. 
. 
48The appellate court could have easily sidestepped the issue entirely. Eakins was 
tried to the court, rather than before a jury, and there exists a presumption in Indiana 
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the logical relevance exception to the general rule of exclusion was 
properly applied under the circumstances, and the evidence was properly 
admitted. 49 
One other notable case in which the identity of the perpetrator was 
seriously in dispute was Henderson v. State.50 In Henderson, the defend-
ant was on trial for burglary and theft arising from facts relayed to 
police by an eyewitness.51 The witness observed a man leave a neighbor's 
home with a television set and place the set in a gold Ford L TO bearing 
Indiana license plate number 99H8889. The police later discovered that 
the defendant owned a Ford with Indiana license plate number 99T8889, 
but the witness had some difficulty identifying the defendant.52 
At trial, defendant challenged her identification evidence. 53 In re-
sponse, the state offered and the trial court admitted the testimony of 
one Alonzo Bellmar.54 Bellmar, in a later incident, had chased a man 
be discovered exiting his home through a window. This man, identified 
as the defendant, ran toward a tan Ford with Indiana license plate 
number 99T8889 parked nearby before Bellmar lost sight of him. The 
Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the state's argument that Bellmar's 
other crime testimony fit within the common scheme or plan exception55 
but declared the evidence highly relevant to the issue of identity and 
therefore admissible.56 The only significantly identifiable feature here, 
besides the witnesses' identification, was the license plate number. That 
law that a trial court ignores improperly admitted evidence, absent any indication it 
significantly affected the court's decision. E.g., Pinkston v. State, 436 N .E.2d 306, 308 
(Ind. 1982); Phelan v. State, 273 Ind. 542, 546, 406 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1980). 
4~Eakins, 484 N.E.2d at 609. The court also stated that the evidenc·e fit the common 
plan or scheme exception. Id. Indiana courts seem frequently to confuse the "modus 
operandi'' exception with the common plan or scheme exception. This latter exception is 
used to "prove the existence of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which 
the present crime on trial is a part." E.W. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 448 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter HANDBOOK 
OF EviDENCE]. It is apparent from the facts in Eakins that there were two separate, 
distinguishable incidents that were not smaller parts of any larger, deliberate scheme to 
seduce and then harass the female student population of the high school. The defendant 
could not have had a deliberate plan in mind that both relationships would be ended by 
the victim and he would subsequently harass them by telephone. Rather, the cause and 
effect nature of both offenses would make the "motive" exception to the rule much more 
applicable than the common scheme or plan exception. 
50489 N .E.2d 68 (Ind. 1986). 
$•Jd. at 69. 
szJd. at 70. She was acquainted with and recognized the defendant but had at first 
confused his name with that of someone else. Id. 
Slid. 
54/d. at 70-71. 
~'Id. 
$6/d. (presumably, although not denominated so, under the "modus operandi,, ex-
ception). 
• 
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evidence was so specific and so singular as to be the hypothetical ''silver 
. cross-bow" regarded as ideal signature evidence of a perpetrator. 51 Such 
a perfect example of the ''modus operandi'' /identity exception is ob-
viously rare. Where identity was the issue and the jury would not be 
misled, there could be no argument that the evidence was neither logically 
nor legally relevant. The evidence was properly admitted. 
The unfortunate Leroy Williams was the defendant in two cases 
during the survey period. 58 In the first Williams v. State, 59 Williams was 
apprehended in the home of 74-year-old Mabel Carpenter, Williams 
advised the police that he had stolen a television set earlier that evening 
during the burglary of another home. On appeal, Williams argued that 
the trial court had improperly admitted this statement during his trial 
for the burglary of Carpenter's home.60 The Indiana Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's admission on the grounds that it was relevant 
to establish Williams' intent and/ or motive for the burglary. 61 The 
supreme court aptly and succinctly declared: '' [T]here is no substantial 
question that the defendant committed the acts which led to the charge, 
but rather the issue is the defendant's motive or criminal intent" in 
breaking and entering.62 Williams' confession of the television theft from 
another home was the only evidence of his motive and intent to commit 
the felony of theft in Carpenter's home and was crucial to proving all 
the elements of the charged burglary. This evidence would not have 
prejudiced the defendant before the jury and was therefore not legally 
irrelevant. 
A similar Indiana Supreme Court decision just five weeks prior to 
Williams came to a similar conclusion but without the same reasoned 
. . . 
analysis. In Sizemore v. State, 63 the facts were not nearly as clear as 
in Williams. A Mr. Abel chased the defendant and another intruder out 
of the ransacked second story of his home and forced them to surrender 
after he fired a shot into the rear of their car. Upon investigation, the 
57See FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 8. § 5246, at 513. 
58Williams v. State, 489 N.E.2d 53 (Ind. 1986); Williams v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1319 
(Ind. 1985). 
39481 N.E.2d 1319 (Ind. 1985). 
tt~.>fd. at 1321. 
61/d. The then extant burglary statute defined the charged offense as follows: 
A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, 
with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony. 
However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with 
a deadly weapon or if the building or structure is a dwelling, and a Class A 
felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person 
other than a defendant. 
IND. CODE § 35·43-2-1 (1982). 
62 Williams, 481 N.E.2d at 1321. 
63480 N.-E.2d 215 (Ind. 1985). 
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police and Abel discovered on Abel's premises several items that had 
been stolen from two other homes that same day. The supreme court, 
in upholding the admission of these items into evidence, relied upon the 
intent and the common scheme or plan exceptions.64 
The court did not precisely explain how the intent exception applied 
in Sizemore. However, the facts of this case fit within the Williams 
analysis described above. The evidence was relevant to show that the 
defendant intended to commit theft once he had entered the premises.65 
The court did explain that the items taken from other residences estab-
lished a common plan or scheme of the defendant and his accomplice 
to burglarize residences that particular day. 66 The problem with the court's 
reasoning is that the court injected the ''signature'' requirement of the 
"modus operandi" exception into its explanation of the common scheme 
or plan exception, thereby confusing evidence of identity with evidence 
of intent.67 There was no need for identity evidence because identity was 
never in question. The court's common scheme or plan analysis was 
also weak because the "distinctive" feature upon which the court focused 
was the manner of entry into the burglarized homes kicking in the 
front door. 68 Such kicking is hardly distinctive, however, when even 
homeowners have been known to do the same thing to their own homes. 
Other than this flawed dictum, the court's review of the trial court's 
admission of the other crime evidence of theft, which circumstantially 
linked the defendant to all three locations, was sound. 
A rather perfunctory result arose in Brackens v. State. 69 In that 
case, the defendant was accused of sexually molesting his seven-year-
old niece by marriage.70 The challenged evidence was the victim's tes-
timony that the defendant had engaged in prior sexual acts with her.71 
The issue addressed by this evidence was the defendant's denial of the 
prior acts and his further denial that he had even touched the victim 
that day. The trial court allowed the testimony under the ''depraved 
sexual instinct'' exception, to show that the defendant had had prior 
sexual contact with the victim, despite his denial of the charged offense. 72 
64/d. at 217. 
6Sfd. 
6/)/d. Such a conclusion might also have been appropriate to show the intent element, 
particularly since the defendant relied upon the defense of intoxication despite his testimony 
that he had accompanied the accomplice throughout the day. See also HANDBOOK OF 
EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 448-49. 
67See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text. 
68Sizemore, 480 N.E.2d at 217. 
69480 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1985). 
70/d. at 538. 
7
'/d. at 539. 
72Jd. 
-. 
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The -supreme court supported the trial court's ruling. However,_ the 
evidence of past acts in this case may not have been relevant to any 
specific factual dispute at issue. Such a blanket application of the 
depraved sexual instinct exception regardless of the facts exemplifies how 
courts tend to use this exception as a general rule when certain sex 
offenses are charged and there is evidence that the defendant has com-
mitted the- same or a similar offense at another time. 73 Such uncritical 
application of the exception seems to undermine the general rule of 
exclusion. However, one commentator has defended this type of general 
use of the depraved sexual instinct exception by arguing that it creates 
an ''issue" akin to a motive for committing the offense.74 This ''motive" 
is that the defendant has ''a passion or propensity for illicit sexual 
relations with the particular person concerned in the crime on trial.' '75 
An implication that the defendant has a character flaw, such as a general 
propensity for this kind of behavior, is mitigated by limiting the evidence 
to a relationship with only the victim.76 On this restricted basis, the 
admission of the evidence in Brackens was entirely appropriate and was 
no more prejudicial than the charged offense itself. 77 
13See HANDBOOK OF EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 449 n.40. 
74/d. at 449-50 . 
15/d. at 449 n.38 (emphasis added). 
76lt would appear, however, that some Indiana cases have used the "depraved sexual 
instinct'' exception without regard to whether the victim is the same in all of the offenses. 
See, e.g., Austin v. State, 262 Ind. 529, 319 N .E.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
1012 (l975); Miller v. State, 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299 (1971). The rationale for this 
expansion of the exception may be that the unnaturalness of the sex act is distinctive in 
and of itself. See HANDBOOK OF EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 449. This is especiaHy 
important now that th.e Indiana Supreme Court no longer categorizes rape among the 
exceptions for depraved sexual instinct (at least where consent is the only issue). See, 
e.g., Jenkins v. State, 474 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985); Malone v. State, 441 N'.E.2d 1339 
(Ind. 1982); Meeks v. State, 249 Ind. 659, 234 N.E.2d 629 (1968). But any extension of 
admissibility on the basis of the unusual nature <;»f sex crimes lends its_elf to the dangers 
of admitting offenses that may only show a repeated commission of the same sort of 
crime rather than evidence of crimes with unusual features. Such a result has been decried 
by Indiana courts. See, e.g., Duvose v. State, 257 Ind. 450;. 452, 275 N .E.2d 536, 537 
(1971) (rape); see also Raines v. State, 251 Ind. 248, 240 N.E.2d 819 (1968) (evidence of 
homosexual acts has no relevance at murder trial). 
77The supreme court also noted that most of the victim;s :challenged testimony came 
forth during her cross-examination by the defense, as if to imply that any error in 
admission was harmless because the defendant ''opened the door.'' Brackens, 480 N.E.2d 
at 539. See also Haynes v. State, 411 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Gilliam v. 
State, 270 Ind. 71, 76-77, 383 N .E.2d 297, 301 :( 1978). Such implication though misses 
the point when it was the state that first raised the topic on direct examination, although 
defendanes cross-examination on the subject could arguably be a waiver of any objection 
to the original dire_ct testimony. 
The irony is that the court misapplied the "opened door" exception later in the 
case. Brackens took the stand in his own defense to deny the charges. Brackens, 480 
• 
• 
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An interesting set of facts arose in Gibbs v. State, 78 where the 
defendant was convicted of attempted murder for a vehicular attack on 
a woman he later married.79 On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
trial court erred in allowing the state to question him and the victim 
about their prostitution·related activities. 80 The defendant had a business 
as well as a romantic relationship with the victim, involving the victim's 
employment as a prostitute. At the time of the attack, the victim was 
preparing to leave the defendant's employ. The Indiana Supreme Court 
held that such evidence could well provide information about the defend-
ant's motive for the attack. 81 Such evidence was deemed particularly 
N.E.2d at 539. In doing so, he put his credibility as a witness at issue. The state was 
thus justified in introducing evidence of his prior convictions for theft and robbery-
infamous crimes-to impeach him. The court declared the defendant had "opened the 
door, for impeachment purposes. !d. at 540. While this evidence fits the classic Ashton 
v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210 (1972), formula for impeachment of Brackens' 
credibility, it has nothing to do with the "opened door" exception. See supra notes 4 
and 5 and accompanying text. Although theft was not originally considered in the Ashton 
v. Anderson genre, the Indiana Supreme Court considered it a crime involving dishonesty 
and added it to the Ashton list in Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 136-37, 340 N .E.2d 
771, 774-75 (1976). However, admission of theft convictions can be prohibited if they 
"arise from factual situations which do not indicate a lack of veracity on the part of 
the witness." /d. at 137, 340 N .E.2d at 775. This limitation can only be triggered by 
defense counsel, preferably by motion in limine. /d. In the absence of a proper foundation 
by defense counsel, one must assume that Brackens• theft conviction was properly admitted 
for impeachment purposes. 
A classic "opened door'' testimony did arise in the murder/battery case of Davis 
v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387 (Ind. 1985). The defendant called one Coomes as a witness to 
buttress his claim of self-defense. Coomes testified about a conversation the defendant 
had had with his two victims during which the victims discussed their prison experiences. 
This evidence was adduced to substantiate the defendant's fear that these two men would 
seriously injure or kill him and to explain why he stabbed them during a fight. /d. at 
389. What the defendant tried to "close the door" on was the fact that during that same 
conversation, he revealed to the victims that he too had been in prison. The trial court 
had allowed this fact to be brought out on Coomes's cross-examination. /d. The Indiana 
Supreme Court ruled that not only was this testimony highly relevant to rebut defendant's 
factual defense, but that he had also opened the door on direct examination. /d. As the 
court remarked: 
[O]ur courts frequently have held in other contexts that a party may not submit 
evidence of part of a conversation, transaction, deposition or the evidentiary 
material without giving the other party an opportunity to introduce the remaining 
material if it is necessary to explain or illustrate the context from which the 
excerpted evidence was taken, or to mitigate the prejudice caused by introduction 
of only part of the evidence in question. 
/d. This correct statement of the exception contrasts starkly with the court's statements 
in Brackens. 
78483 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. 1985). 
79/d. at 1366. 
80/d. at 1368. 
81 /d. A similar set of facts was present in Harms v. State, 156 Ind. App. 123, 295 
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relevant where motive was tied to the specific intent element of the 
attempted murder charge and where the victim denied that the defendant 
struck her intentionally. 82 Because the unrelated prostitution activities 
could hardly prejudice a jury trying an attempted murder case, the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any dangers of 
legal irrelevance, and the supreme court properly upheld the trial court. 
The last example of a correctly-decided case dealt with a problem 
all too frequently encountered in trial courts. In Riley v. State, 83 the 
Indiana Supreme Court reversed a drug dealing conviction because the 
state had injected an "evidentiary harpoon" into the trial, under the 
guise of the common scheme or plan ·exception.84 The trial court had 
granted the defendant's motion in limine to protect him from any mention 
of prior drug use or sales. ss In spite of the court's order and the 
defendant's repeated objections, the prosecutor persisted in questioning 
the state's sole witness about prior buys from the defendant.86 The trial 
court eventually relented and allowed the evidence upon a showing that 
there were similarities among all of the defendant's sales to the witness. 87 
In reversing, the supreme court declared there were no distinctive 
characteristics of the transactions to fit within the common scheme 
exception. 88 Thus, the evidence had been improperly admitted, particularly 
with respect to drug use. 89 The court then astutely observed that because 
the state's sole evidence was from a single witness, the "evidentiary 
harpoon'' 90 of improper evidence injected by the state could only have 
bolstered its case unfairly before the jury. 91 The defendant was therefore 
granted a new trial. 92 
N.E.2d 156 (1973), where the deceased victim threatened to withdraw from a burglary 
ring and go to the police. 
82Gibbs, 483 N .E.2d at 1366. 
83489 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 1986). 
84/d. at 61. 
85/d. at 59. 
86/d. at 59·61. 
87/d. at 61. 
88/d. The court would probably have been more correct if it had addressed the 
"modus operandP' exception. 
89/d. 
90
"Evidentiary harpoon" is defined in Indiana as that circumstance "where the 
prosecution through its witnesses successfully places evidence before the jury which is 
improper . . . in situations where such evidence would not be admissible.'' Grimes v. 
State, 258 Ind. 257, 262, 280 N .E.2d 575, 578 (1972) (citation omitted). 
91 Riley, 489 N .E.2d at 61. The evidence of prior sales was also not crucial to show 
that the witness could identify the defendant because they were also friends. See, e.g., 
United States v. Juarez, 561 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1977). 
92Ri/ey, 489 N.E.2d at 61. 
• 
1987] OTHER CRIME EVIDENCE 197 
B. Right Result, Wrong Reason 
• 
In this next group of cases, the· appellate courts reached the proper 
conclusion that evidence of other crimes fell within one of the permitted 
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. However, the specific ex-
ceptions invoked by the courts were not necessarily correct. 
In Jones v .. State, 93 the supreme court clearly demonstrated the respect 
given to trial court discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 
The defendant was convicted of robbery and criminal deviate conduct 
for robbing a savings and loan association and forcing one of the female 
employees to disrobe and commit oral sodomy.94 At trial, the victim of 
a similar crime testified to events occurring several weeks earlier at a 
gas station one-half block from the savings and loan. This witness had 
been unable to identify her attacker until the police showed her a picture 
of the savings and loan perpetrator. The defendant argued that evidence 
of the gas station incident was inadmissible at trial. 95 
The supreme court ruled the evidence admissible to prove the per-
petrator's identity and to prove a common plan or scheme, because of 
the distinctive characteristics present in both crimes. 96 However, the 
common plan or scheme exception is used to ''prove the existence of 
a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the present 
crime on trial is a part.' ' 97 Such a larger plan did not exist here nor 
did the court so hold. What the court was actually using, without properly 
identifying it, was the ''modus operandi" exception wherein other crime 
evidence· is admissible on the grounds of relevance because of the same 
distinct, unusual, or unique method employed in committing the charged 
offense.98 
By repeated, improper use of the term "common scheme or plan," 
Indiana courts have bastardized the "modus operandi" exception by 
requiring something less than an unusual or unique device. Perhaps by 
connoting "common," "scheme," and "plan" instead of "modus op-
erandi,'' the courts have felt compelled to admit evidence as meager as 
some vague pattern of behavior. As a consequence, many decisions have 
upheld the admission of evidence evincing no characteristics distinct from 
other crimes committed by other defendants under the rubric of ''common 
93479 N .E.2d 44 (Ind. 1985). 
94/d. at 44. 
• 
95/d. at 46. 
96/d. 
97HANDBOOK OF EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 448-49 (footnote omitted). 
98See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text. One could argue that this is 
a hypertechnical distinction when in fact the unique features of both offenses, and not 
the name of the exception, were the actual test of admissibility in the case and the correct 
result was reached. The distinction is valid. 
• 
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scheme or plan."99 In other words, "similarities'' has become the op ... 
erative term, rather than "uniqueness." This lapse creates problems in 
a case such as Jones v. State where the only truly distinctive element 
of each offense was the combination of armed robbery at a business 
establishment with the commission of an act of oral sodomy upon a 
female employee. 
But for the nature of the premises and the specific nature of the 
deviate sex act involved, Jones would be no different from any other 
offense combining violent larceny with a violent sex act. It is not unusual 
for rape and robbery to be combined during a residential burglary, 100 
but it is arguable that forcing a victim to commit fellatio where the 
perpetrator risks detection during business hours of the targeted estab-
lishment is unique. Thus, in Jones there was minimal logical relevance 
of the other crime evidence to the issue of Jones' identity . 101 As for 
99ln Wiles v. State, 437 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 1982), the state put on the testimony of 
a prior rape victim during the burglary/attempted rape trial of the defendant. The 
"identification" exception (presumably common scheme or plan) was invoked to show 
the following similarities between the two events: 
(I) the perpetrator threatened the victim with a knife; 
(2) money and jewelry were stolen; 
(3) the perpetrator wore a long-sleeved shirt in mid-summer; 
(4) the attacks occurred in the same area of Indianapolis; 
(5) the attacks were seventeen days apart; and 
(6) the attacker cut the cords to the victims' extension phones. 
/d. at 39. Unfortunately, this scenario is common in other run-of-the-mill rape/burglary 
offenses. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 275 Ind. 434, 417 N .E.2d 328 (1981); Willis v. 
State, 268 Ind. 269, 374 N .E.2d 520 (1978). In fact, the common scheme or plan exception 
was also used in Williams v. State to admit factual similarities in two separate incidents 
of rape. The admitted facts "were: 
. 
( 1) two perpetrators; 
(2) one wore a ski mask, the other a red hooded sweatshirt; 
(3) obscene phone calls preceded the attacks; 
(4) the victims' husbands worked nights, which was when the attacks occurred; 
(5) the attackers pried open the back door and left it open afterwards; 
(6) a butcher knife was used to threaten the victims; 
(7) the victims' hands were tied; 
(8) the perpetrators cut the phone wires; 
(9) the attacks were about a week apart; and 
( 1 0) the attackers stole personal property . 
Williams, 215 Ind. at 440, 417 N .E.2d at 332. The red hooded sweatshirt was perhaps 
a distinctive enough feature in Williams to justify admission of the evidence. However, 
there does not appear to have been any question of identity involved in the case. 
100See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 474 N .E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985); Wiles v. State, 437 N .E.2d 
35 (Ind. 1982); Williams v. State, 275 Ind. 434, 417 N.E.2d 328 (1981). 
101The facts of Jones are not the least bit illuminating with regard to the defense of 
the case and whether identity was in serious dispute. Due to the seriousness of the crime, 
one can presume that the defendant denied any involvement, thereby putting his identity 
at issue. 
• 
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. . 
legal relevance, prejudice to the defendant was diminished by the fact 
that both crimes \\iere of the same inflammatory nature. Because the 
charged crime was highly offensive, a jury was unlikely to have been 
prejudiced by evidence of a second evil act. It would appear then that 
the Indiana Supreme Court's affirmance of Jones' conviction upon 
evidence having such a tenuous relevancy connection was a deferral to 
the trial court's discretion to admit such evidence.l02 
The next case in the ''right result, wrong reason" genre is Schoffstall 
v. State.I03 Schoffstall was convicted of reckless homicide for the death 
of his infant son, which occurred while the baby was in Schoffstall's 
custody. 104 During trial, Schoffstall objected to the admission of autopsy 
photographs and to the testimony of a forensic pathologist that prior 
to the date of death, the baby had sustained numerous injuries to his 
spleen, left lung, lip, eye and cheek, and brain. 105 The pathologist 
concluded the baby was a victim of child abuse syndrome. 106 Schoffstall's 
wife also testified to circumstantial evidence of his abuse of the baby, 
and Schoffstall himself admitted during statements to police that he had 
hit the child. Schoffstall objected to the admission of this c ,ridence on 
·grounds of irrelevancy and immateriality. 107 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the evidence was admissible under the relevancy exceptions_ 
of motive, intent, or common scheme or plan. tos 
The evidence was indeed admissible but not under any of these 
named exceptions. Although the facts are not clear with respect to what 
offense Schoffstall was. charged with, it is clear he was convicted of 
reckless homicide. 109 The statutory elements of this crime are: ''A person 
who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, a 
Class C felony.'' 110 Reckless homicide is not an ''intentional'' crime for 
. 
102An argumen.t can also be made for reversal. It appears that there was sufficient 
independent evidence of identity by the employees of the savings and loan to obviate the 
need for the other victim's testimony. One could also contend, obversely to the author's 
conclusion, that because the very nature of the crimes was so inflammatory, evidence of 
a second such crime by th~ defendant would have prejudiced the Jury. Precedential authority 
would have permitted reversal under such circumstances. See, e.g., Riddle v. State, 264 
Ind. 587, 348 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Brooks v. State, 156 Ind. App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894 
(1973). Because of the abuse of discretion standard, however, the: issue of reversal in 
Jones becomes an academic :question the answer to which is dependent upon evidence 
which may be in the record but is not clearly set forth in the opinion. 
103488 N .E.2d 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
104/d. at 351. 
10
'/d. at 351-54. 
106/d. at 3 51. 
lfY'IJd. at 354. 
108/d. at 355. 
109/d. at 350. 
uoiND. ConE § 35-42-1-5 (1982). 
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which prior child abuse evidence would be relevant to show motive or 
intent, as it would for murder.n' Use of the common scheme or plan 
exception is not justified either because typically child abuse is not a 
continuing deliberate plan or scheme but rather is the result of uncon-
trollable and/or irrational behavior continuing in an unplanned and 
erratic fashion throughout a parent (adult)/child relationship~ 
. 
The valid relevance exception better suited for child abuse cases, 
although not yet adopted by Indiana courts, is the "corpus delicti, 
exception. The "corpus delicti" exception allows the admission of evi-
dence of other crimes as proof that a criminal act took place. 112 This 
exception is particularly useful where the defendant acknowledges that 
harm occurred but denies that the harm was caused by arty criminal 
instrumentality. 113 Refuting the defense of absence of "corpus delicti" 
requires a showing that the defendant has, in the past, engaged in similar 
criminal conduct. 114 The risk inherent in the '~corpus delicti" exception 
is that it may be easily abused to show only propensity, a result scru-
pulously rejected by the case law.~ 15 However, in Schoffstall, evidence 
• 
that the defendant's relationship with his son was characterized by 
instances of other criminally violent acts of physical abuse tended directly 
to rebut defendant's allegation that the child was injured by accident. 116 
Application of this "corpus delicti" exception should be limited to 
admission of evidence of a pattern of child abuse between the defendant 
and the victim. If so applied, the exception would be consistent with 
an ideal application of the depraved sexual instinct exception where 
evidence of criminal acts with other victims is excluded. Such a limitation 
would avoid the problems arising in cases such as United States v. 
Woods, 1 17 where the defendant's propensity for abusing children in general 
11 rSee Worthington v. State, 273 Ind. 499, 405 N.E.2d 913 (1980), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 915 (1981) (defendant charged and convicted of second degree murder for death of 
seven-year-old adopted daughter); O'Conner v. State, 272 Ind. 460, 399 N.E.2d 364 (1980) 
(defendant charged with second degree murder of three-year-old child); Corbin v. State~ 
250 Ind. 147~ 234 N.E.2d 261 (1968) (defendant indicted first degree, convicted second 
degree murder of 21-month-old daughter). In each of- these cases, prior evidence of child 
abuse was admitted for the purpose of showing malice, premeditation, intent, or motive. 
These exceptions were appropriately applied tlecause o.f the intentional nature of the 
charged and/or convicted offenses. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3404 (Burns 1956) (second 
degree murder). For current version, see IND. ConE § 35-42-1-3 (1986). 
111See FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 8, § 5239, at 460 (footnotes 
omitted). 
llJfd. 
114/d. 
115/d. at 460-61. 
116Schojjstal/, 488 N .E.2d at 354·55. 
117484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). In Woods, the defendant was convicted for the 
smothering death of her eight-month•old foster son, who died of cyanosis. ld. at 128-29. 
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became the chief characteristic of the evidence. 118 In Schoffstall, the 
evidence of previous abuse to the same infant was highly relevant to 
establish that a "corpus delicti'' existed despite Schoffstall's represen-
tations of an accident. The logical relevance by sheer necessity sub-
stantially outweighed any potential prejudice. The court of appeals' 
reasoning notwithstanding, the evidence was properly admitted. 
Hossman v. State119 is not analyzed for its result as much as for 
the improper logic of its dicta. Hassman was convicted of burglary, 
conspiracy, and receiving stolen property .120 The burglary and conspiracy 
convictions rested upon evidence that the defendant directed two other 
,men to break into a home to steal some drinking glasses. 121 The defendant 
challenged testimony, allowed by the trial court, alleging that one of 
these same men had sold other goods to the defendant on prior oc-
casions.122 Pointing out that there was no criminality attached to these 
sales, the court of appeals noted that the sole purpose for their admission 
was to show an earlier connection between the defendant and this other 
man by reason of a business relationship. 123 However, the court went 
further and declared that even if the state's evidence had evinced crim-
inality, it would have fit within the common scheme or plan exception 
to show identification, intent, or state of mind. 124 This declaration in-
correctly invoked the common scheme or plan exception because there 
was no evidence that such a plan even existed or that the burglary was 
a part thereof. The common plan or scheme exception was therefore 
irrelevant. 
What the court did point out, perhaps unwittingly, was that the 
evidence was relevant to show intent or motive. A close analysis of the 
· facts and the targeted offenses reveals that the court made an excellent 
connection between the charged crime and the intent and motive ex-
The prosecution was allowed to submit evidence that the defendant had been involved in 
twenty earlier cyanotic episodes with nine different children, seven of whom died. Id. at 
130. The controversy, of course, was balancing the difficulty of proving that the death 
of the infant was caused by a criminal instrumentality and thus "corpus delicti" with 
the prejudice inherent in admitting the evidence purely to show the defendant's character 
flaw. The controversy will continue to rage but is really of no moment in the classic 
parent/battered child relationship, such as in Schoffstall, where the abuse is part of a 
continuing relationship. 
118/d. at 130-32. 
119482 N .E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
120/d. at 1152·53. His conviction for receiving stolen property w~s reversed on a 
separate appeaL /d. at 1153. The burglary and conspiracy convictions resulted from a 
. 
new trial after the first was declared a mistrial. /d. at 1152-53. 
121/d. at 1152. 
122/d. at 1157. 
123/d. 
124/d. 
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ceptions for relevancy. Evidence of Hassman's prior receipt of stolen 
goods would supply a motive 125 for his vicarious involvement in the 
burglaries committed by other parties, as well as show the specific intent 
of theft, the predicate for burglary. Although Hassman's conviction for 
receiving stolen property was overturned, the relevancy link is clear and 
0 
is sufficient to justify the admission of this evidence going to issues that 
could not help but be in dispute because of Rossman's limited role in 
the commission of the crime. 
C. No Harm, No Foul 
Several cases in the survey period improperly upheld the admission 
of other crime evidence; however, a thorough examination reveals that 
in each case the admission was harmless. One example is Foster v. 
State, 126 which otherwise would be an excellent example of the common 
scheme or plan exception. In Foster, a jury found the defendant guilty 
of forgery for signing his employer's name on a stolen blank payroll 
check and then cashing it. 127 Among the evidence presented were three 
other payroll checks cashed the same day that were within the numerical 
sequence of the subject check. The conclusion was that the defendant 
had embarked upon a calculated plan to obtain money through fraud. 128 
This is a classic example of a common scheme or plan, where 
evidence is excepted from the general rule of exclusion because it tends 
to prove a fact at issue, such as the identity of the perpetrator or the 
defendant's intent. The problem in Foster is that, contrary to the court's 
rationale, there appears to have been no question of the defendant's 
identity at trial. 129 Nor would these checks necessarily have presented 
any more definite evidence of intent to defraud than the single check 
upon which the information had been filed. There appears to have been 
no serious dispute over any issue requiring this evidence to make the 
state's case. If not, the three "unrelated" checks should have been ruled 
inadmissible. However, any error was rendered harmless when the defend-
ant's brother testified, evidently without objection, to_ the defendant's 
illegal transactions with these other checks, thereby making the erro-
neously admitted evidence cumulative only. 130 The improperly admitted 
12
.sFor good examples of the use of the motive exception, see Jenkins v. State, 263 
Ind. 589, 590-92, 335 N.E.2d 215, 216~17 (1975); Thomas v. State, 263 Ind . 198, 199-
201, 328 N.E.2d 212, 212-13 (1975). 
126484 N .E.2d 965 (Ind. 1985). 
12
' /d. at 966. 
1281d. at 967. 
129Bank employees, called as witnesses, identified the defendant. Id. The court ruled 
that the other checks "reinforced identification testimony." /d. 
1301d.; see Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d 445, 461 (Ind. 1985) (improperly admitted 
• 
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other crime evidence in Foster was therefore rendered nonprejudicial as 
a matter of law. 
Clarkson v. State131 presented another classic example of a common 
scheme or plan. The defendant was convicted of theft and violation of 
state securities laws for defrauding an elderly couple under the guise of 
an investment plan. 132 The questionable evidence here was the testimony 
of three other elderly women, who told of their own experiences with 
the defendant's confidence scheme. 133 As in Foster, the evidence was 
presumably ~admitted to show intent to defraud. 134 And as in Foster, 
such testimony had no greater tendency to show intent than the evidence 
of the charged offense itself. The other three incidents were unnecessary 
to the prosecution's case. The error here is particularly acut'~ because 
intent is not required to violate the securities laws, 135 and the court never 
addressed the requirement of ''intent to deprive'' of use under the theft 
statute.136 Therefore, the evidence was irrelevant to any question of intent 
to defraud under the securities laws because this was not an issue at 
. . . . . . . . 
trial. And clearly the theft intent was also not the issue. Because the 
other women's testimony had no logical relevance to any issue of intent, 
the evidence was inadmissible on this basis. 
. . 
The court though did state that the women's testimony was crucial 
to show a scheme to defraud, 137 which is an element of a securities law 
violation. Again however, the testimony had no greater probity than the 
evidence of the subject offense and was therefore an unnecessary presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence on an issue already adequately supported 
by other evidence. But, as in Foster, any error was rendered harmless 
by the defendant's failure to object to the testimony of two of the 
witnesses. 138 
A third common scheme or plan was present in Alvers v. State. 139 
.. 
Alvers was a jeweler who had a habit of receiving stolen property and 
of substituting cubic zirconias for diamonds in jewelry left in his care 
for repair. The grand jury indicted him for corrupt business influence 
upon seven predicate offenses of this nature. 140 At trial, the objectionable 
evidence does not require reversal if cumulative of other evidence); Johnson v. State, 251 
Ind. 369, 374, 241 N .E.2d 270, 272 (1968). 
131486 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1985). 
132/d. at 503. 
133/d. at 506. 
134Jd. 
nssriefly, Indiana state securities laws presume criminal intent from a defendant's 
acts. /d. at 507. See IND. CoDE § 23-2-1-1 (1982). 
136See IND. CooE § 35-43-4-2(a) ( 1986). 
'
37C/arkson, 486 N.E.2d at 506. 
138/d. 
139489 N .E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)~ 
140/d. at 85; see IND. ConE § 35-45-6-2 (1982). 
• 
• 
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evidence was the testimony of two other victims of Alvers' operation. 141 
The testimony was allowed as proof of a common scheme or plan. 142 
But of what practical necessity was this testimony when tQe seven pred-
icate offenses raised the inference of such scheme anyway? The evidence 
was improperly admitted. Its admission was harmless, though, because 
the testimony of the other victims could have had little, if any, prejudicial 
effect on the jury's deliberations.t43 The trial's outcome would not have 
been different even had this testimo,ny been excluded because the great 
weight of the evidence of a common scheme or plan presented by the 
seven separate charges would have convicted Alvers: anyway. 
In Graham v. State, 144 the defendants were charged with and convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and the unlawful practice 
of medicine in the death of one Sybil Bennett. 145 The Grahams had 
established Hoosier Health House in order to treat individuals with 
medical problems by naturopathic means, in accordance with the teachings 
of a prophet of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Bennett went to 
the Grahams for treatment of a lump on her breast. Without the benefit 
of conventional medical treatment, Bennett eventually died under the 
Grahams' care from complications of breast cancer. At trial,. the state 
introduced evidence that the Grahams were administering ana charging 
for similar services provided to other pe·ople.146 The court of appeals 
upheld the admission of this evidence for purposes of showing ~'intent, 
motive, purpose, identification, or a common scheme or plan. " 147 This 
bare· recital of the general exception, with no further explanation, was 
the only rationale given. At most, the evidence showed a common scheme 
to engage in the unlawful practice of medicine, but there was no issue 
in dispute requiring the evidence as proof of identity or intent. The 
evidence pertinent to Bennett's death was sufficient to show the defend ... 
ants' unlawful practice of medicine. More evidence of the same character, 
presented even as part of a scheme, would not have had any tendency 
to make the existence of the unlawful practice of medicine any more 
probable than without it. Nor was the evidence relevant to any material 
issue of fact as to the manslaughter and reckless homicide charges. The 
evidence was irrelevant and therefore improperly admitted. However, as 
in Alvers, because of the sheer weight of the state's case, there was no 
danger that the improper admission misled or unfairly prejudiced the 
jury; it was harmless error. 
141A/vers, 489 N .E.2d at 89. 
142/d. at 90. 
14~See, e.g., Gill v. State, 467 N.E~2d 724, 725 (Ind. 1984); Brewster v. State, 450 
N .E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. 1983). 
1444'80 N .E.2d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
145ld. at 983-84 (footnotes omitted). 
146/d. at 992. 
141Jd. 
• 
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The second Williams v. State148 case involved Williams' conviction 
for the other burglary he confessed to committing after his apprehension 
in Mrs. Carpenter's home. 149 To review briefly, Williams was convicted 
for burglary of the Carpenter home. His confession to an earlier burglary 
and theft was used to establish his intent to commit theft in the Carpenter · 
home. 150 The state's case here, the prosecution of that other burglary, 
was based upon Williams' confession, the presence of a stolen television 
nearby, and fresh blood matching Williams' blood type found on the 
burglarized premises. 151 During trial, the state was granted leave to 
describe Williams' arrest in Carpenter's home, especially the fact that 
he was bleeding at the time. 152 There is no problem with the admission 
of evidence that Williams was bleeding at the time of his arrest; what 
was error was the admission of evidence of the situs of the arrest. The 
state's evidence of Williams' presence at the first house {blood) and of 
the theft of the television therefrom was sufficient for conviction. The 
fact that Williams was in Carpenter's house at the time of his arrest 
and had committed another burglary there had no probative value to 
the state's case and was erroneously admitted. It was harmless error, 
however, for the same reason as in Graham and Alvers; the evidence 
of the charged offense and of the defendant's guilt was not so equivocal 
as to have unfairly affected the jury. 
The error in the next "no harm-no foul" case was also harmless 
by reason of the very limited effect the improper evidence could have 
had on the jury. Forehand v. State153 involved the defendant's conviction 
for dealing in phencyclidine (PCP), a Schedule II controlled substance. 154 
During the state's examination of the arresting officers, an earlier sale 
of marijuana, made at the defendant's direction, was revealed. 155 The 
Indiana Supreme Court upheld the admission of the testimony on the 
basis of res gestae .. 156 The marijuana sale was held to be part and parcel 
of the negotiation and sale of the PCP even though the marijuana sale 
was three days before the commission of the charged offense. 157 
. 
The application of the res gestae exception was stretched beyond its 
limits. As the court itself stated, "Under the res gestae exception evidence 
may be introduced which completes the story of the crime by proving 
its immediate context .... " 158 There was no "immediacy" to the context 
r 
.j 
. 
148489 N.E.2d 53 (Ind. 1986). 
149See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
150See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
151 Williams, 489 N .E.2d at 55. 
152Jd . 
lS3479 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985). 
154/d. at 554. 
. U5Jd. 
"
6/d. 
157 /d. at 554;.55. 
1
'
8/d. at 554 (emphasis added). 
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here of three days' passage of time. 1s9 Even the civil application of the 
res gestae doctrine could not be extended to justify such a broad ap-
plication.t60 The res gestae exception simply did not apply, and it was 
error to admit the evidence of the marijuana sale. 
One could perhaps argue that the common plan or scheme exception 
would be appropriate, but the relevancy of a marijuana sale would be 
difficult to establish at a trial for dealing in PCP. However, there is 
the possibility that the marijuana sale exhibited a common plan to sell 
controlled substances of all kinds. The problem though is that there was 
no issue in dispute requiring proof of such a plan. When the strength 
of the state's direct evidence from the testimony of the undercover 
officers is considered, there was no element left to be proven that was 
not brought out by their statements. However, because of this strength 
of the state's case and the discretion given to the trial court, the error 
in admission of this other crime evidence can only ·be deemed harmless. 
The last of the "harmless error" cases is Wooden v. State, 161 in 
·~9See, e.g., Moster v. Bower, 153 Ind. App. 158, 170, 286 N.E~2d 418, 425 (1972); 
Tenta v. Guraly, 140 Ind. App. 160, 170-71, 221 N.E.2d 577, 582-83 (1967) (res gestae 
statements must relate to main event). 
'60'fhe court cites to a case expanding the res gestae exception outside the immediate 
time frame to justify the evidence here. /d. at 555. (citing Altman v. State, 466 N .E.2d 
716 (Ind. 1984))~ But that still does not prevent the conclusion that use of the res gestae 
exception in criminal trials in Indiana has been stretched far beyond the definition of the 
term given in Lee v. State, 267 Ind. 315, 320, 370 N.E.2d 327, 329 (1977) (citation 
omitted) as "acts, statements, occurrences and circumstances substantially contemporaneous 
with the crime charged." In the civil context, res gestae refers to a "spontaneous and 
instinctive reaction to a startling or unusual occurrence during which interval certain 
statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate 
design in the formulation of their content" and is used as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. Moster, 153 Ind. App. at 170, 286 N.E.2d at 425 (emphasis deleted). See also Tenta, 
140 Ind. App. at 170-71, 221 N.E.2d at 582-83. Its application in criminal law should 
ideally have the same immediacy limitations but not necessarily as an exception to anything, 
much less as a rule of exclusion of other crime evidence. 
What reflection can other crimes committed as part of or immediately with reference 
to the charged offense have upon the defendant's character? How can it prejudice a 
defendant's case as being unfairly entered into evidence? There seems to be no valid 
reason for applying the rule of exclusion to "necessary parts of the proof of an entire 
deed," "inseparable elements of the deed," or "concomitant parts of the criminal act." 
lA J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 218 (3d ed. 1983). So why 
even have a res gestae exception in criminal law? See Wilson v. State, 491 N .E.2d 537 
(Ind. 1986) (application of res gestae exception conforms to Wigmore's non-exception). 
If there is evidence of other crimes that are part and parcel of a common plan or scheme, 
but which are inadmissible under res gestae because of a lack of immediate context, other 
exceptions already exist to allow admissibility. It therefore might be wise to consider the 
abolition of the rule altogether in the criminal context and either admit the other crime 
evidence as an inseparable portion of the charged crime or under the common scheme 
or plan exception. 
161 486 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 1985). 
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which the defendant was on trial for robbery .162 The trial court granted 
his motion in limine to prohibit the state from eliciting testimony that 
he may have been involved in any other offense while armed with a 
gun. 163 The testimony of the officer who investigated the instant offense 
revealed that the defendant's mug shot was shown to the victim for 
identification. The trial court overruled a defense motion for mistrial, 
and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. 164 The court declared that the 
testimony did not exceed the boundaries of the motion in limine and 
only explained the officer's investigation. 165 
Besides the fact that the officer's investigation appeared to be of 
little relevance to the charged offense, there was absolutely no need for 
his testimony that the police had a photograph of the defendant in their 
files. Mug shots and any references thereto are, with rare exceptions, 
inadmissible because of their tendency to show that a defendant has 
committed or was a suspect in other crimes. 166 The gratuitous injection 
of this information may well have been inadvertent, but it was nonetheless 
improper. The defendant's motion for mistrial was properly denied, 
though, because he could not possibly have been prejudiced by the 
improper evidence. The victim positively and unequivocally identified 
the defendant as the robber. In fact, shortly after the crime, the victim 
recognized him on the street and followed him before calling the police. 
Any error in the reference to the defendant's police photograph was 
therefore harmless. 
D. Wrong Result 
The only case during the survey period in which an error in admission 
of other crime evidence may well have been prejudicial was Stout v. 
State.l67 This conclusion is based upon the facts revealed in the opinion. 
A review of the actual trial transcript might lead to a different conclusion, 
but this analysis is confined to the recitation of facts in the reported 
case, 
In Stout, the offending evidence was initially entered via testimony 
of the defendant's accomplice in burglary and theft. 168 The accomplice 
162/d. at 442. 
163/d. 
l64/d. at 443. 
16Sfd. 
166Police investigation evidence was properly restricted in Williams v. Statet 491 N .E.2d 
540, 541 (Ind. 1986) (police officer not allowed to testify to defendant's initial arrest on 
unrelated charge), but was not in O'Grady v. State, 481 N.E.2d 115, 119-20 n.l (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985) (conviction reversed where police officer's testimony of informant's story 
went beyond established bounds of non-objectionable hearsay). 
167479 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985). 
r68Jd. at 567. 
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implicated the defendant as a participant in multiple burglaries committed 
. . 
prior to the charged offense. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the 
admission of this evidence ''to show common scheme or plan, intent, 
purpose or identity.'' 169 It furnished no further illumination than a citation 
to another case, Foresta v. State. 170 Unfortunately, Foresta is as scantily 
reasoned as Stout and refers only to other crime evidence pertinent t.o 
proof of identity. 171 Identity was not at issue in Stout. The common 
plan or scheme exception might be relevant if the facts of the case were 
clearer because the defendant and his accomplice apparently committed 
several burglaries within a short time period. However, there is no 
evidence in the opinion to justify a conclusion that the defendant engaged 
in a common plan or scheme for a singular purpose. The defendant's 
activities were simply a series of multiple unrelated offenses of which 
the charged offense was only one. 172 The only other value the evidence 
had was to show criminal propensity, which is an impermissible use. 
The admission of the accomplice's testimony cannot be deemed legally 
harmless because other improper evidence was later admitted upon the 
ground that the accomplice's testimony was properly admitted. 
During the further course of the state's case, a police officer testified 
to the course of his investigation leading to the arrest of the defendant. 173 
During this testimony, the officer discussed the whereabouts of the 
defendant and his accomplice on the days prior to the charged crime. 174 
Although the opinion does not recite the actual testimony, it is evident 
. . 
that it concerned the other break-ins and the defendant's role in them,. 
The supreme court upheld the admission of the officer's testimony based 
in part upon the admissibility of the accomplice's testimony. 175 But, as 
already pointed out, that testimony was improperly admitted. Therefore, 
the officer's testimony was also improperly admitted. The sum effect 
of these two errors added to the. posture of the case as otherwise set 
forth in the opinion indicates that reversal was required. 
The other crime evidence elicited from these two witnesses had no 
logical relevance to any material fact at issue in the trial. The majority 
' 
of the state's case appears to have rested on the credibility of the 
accomplice's te~timony as to the facts. 176 His credibility could only have 
been bolstered by the corroborating testimony of a police officer. Ad-
169Jd. 
170274 Ind. 658, 413 N.E.2d 889 (1980). 
171 /d. at 660, 413 N.E.2d at 890-91. 
112ln fact, the supreme court itself treated the charged offense as being motivated by 
a need for money, which is presumably in contradistinction to whatever undisclosed reason 
• 
motivated the other offenses. Stout, 479 N .E.2d at 565. 
173 /d. at 567. 
174/d. at 568. 
175 /d. 
176Also diminishing the persuasiveness of the state's case is the fact 'that the home 
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mission of the other crime evidence obviously enhanced the prosecutor's 
case in the eyes of the jury. However, the evidence was used only to 
show the defendant's propensity for crime rather than substantively to 
prove his guilt of the charged offense. Therefore, this evidence, both 
legally and logically irrelevant, caused prejudicial error and the case 
should have been reversed for a new trial. 177 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
After this cursory glance at the notable cases in this survey period, 
it is apparent that the appellate courts of Indiana have properly applied 
the other crime exceptions less than fifty percent of the time, at least 
in published opinions. It is difficult to determine why there is a probletn 
in this area. It is not difficult to imagine that in the heat of trial, minor 
errors will be made by both the bench and the trial attorneys. Some 
of these exceptions are based on subtle nuances in the facts, and the 
speed at which a trial is conducted is not always conducive to sorting 
through these nuances to reach a proper decision. Under the circum-
stances, it is remarkable that even though the published opinions im-
properly applied the law so often, the trial courts actually erred only 
once. 
There is a remedy which will prevent the occurrence of the errors 
made in the survey opinions which are more often errors of analysis 
than of substance. That solution is to know the facts of each case. 
Only a thorough knowledge of the facts present in both the state's and 
the defense's cases can give one a proper perspective of the context in 
which other crime evidence can be examined. This knowledge must be 
supplied by the trial attorneys in both their presentation at trial and on 
appeal. When the attorneys have supplied the cogent facts, the trial 
courts can apply the law. In doing so, the courts must assume the 
exclusion applies unless and until the facts and their unique juxtaposition 
warrant the application of a specifically tailored exception for a spe-
cifically accepted purpose. The law in Indiana allowing admission of 
other crime evidence despite the general prohibition is not without logic 
and reason, but by its very principles, it can be applied only sparingly. 
Such a thoughtful approach to the law will clarify the exceptions for 
· the trial bench and will establish proper guidelines for the trial bar. 
where the stolen items were found was not within the defendant's exclusive control and 
was accessible to other parties, including the accomplice. See id. at 565. 
177See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 156 Ind. App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894 (1973) (prejudicial 
error to admit evidence of other thefts not reduced to conviction of defendant to show 
behavioral pattern). 
• 
